This paper tests whether manufacturing exporters pay more to educated workers in an e¤ort to ascertain whether the productivity of human capital is raised by exports. Using a panel of matched employer-employee data from Morocco, we …nd no evidence that the education wage premium is higher in exporting sectors and …rms. Although exporters pay more on average, much of the wage di¤erential can be explained by the fact that exporters have a larger workforce and more capital. Educated workers who start working for an exporter do not experience a larger wage increase relative to their previous job. We …nd a mild positive association between exports, technology, and product quality, part of which is due di¤erences in …rm size. We discuss why our results di¤er from those obtained using di¤erent countries and methodologies.
Introduction
Much attention has been devoted to human capital and its role in development (e.g. Lucas 1993 , Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 , Barro and i Martin 1992 . There has also been considerable interest in the role of international trade in fostering rapid growth and productivity gains (e.g. Young 1991 , Coe and Helpman 1995 , Tybout and Westbrook 1995 , Baldwin 2003 , Wagner 2007 . 1 Several explanations have been proposed for the observed relationship between trade and growth.
One of them is that international trade facilitates the transfers of technological and market knowledge, thereby leading to an increase in …rm productivity (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1991 , Das, Roberts and Tybout 2001 , Cameron, Proudman and Redding 2005 , Topalova 2004 ). 2 It is natural to expect educated workers and managers to play a crucial role in this transfers because they are in the position to translate knowledge into new products and procedures (e.g. Tybout 2000, Liu and Tybout 1996) . Human capital and exports thus appear to go hand in hand in the growth process (e.g. Johnson and Sta¤ord 1999 , Acemoglu 2003 , Aw, Roberts and Winston 2001 , Feenstra 2000 , Epifani and Gancia 2004 , Denny, Harmon and Lydon 2002 , Batista 2005 ).
These observations are the starting point for this paper. We examine the link between exports and human capital using survey data on manufacturing …rms in Morocco. At the root of our testing strategy is the simple idea that, if educated workers are more productive in exporting …rms, exporters should pay them more. Comparing the earnings education premium between exporting and non-exporting …rms therefore provides an indirect test that human capital is essential for trade-related productivity grains. The maintained hypothesis behind our 1 See also Keller (1998) for evidence undermining the evidence presented by Coe and Helpman (1995) , and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) for evidence that trade openness and growth are statistically unrelated.
2 Some studies, however, have found that, while exporting …rms were more productive before exporting, the fact of exporting need not increase …rm productivity (e.g. Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998 , Fafchamps, El Hamine and Zeufack 2007 , Soderbom and Teal 2000 . approach is that …rms share some of their productivity rents with workers, an idea that has gained widespread acceptance (e.g. Oi and Idson 1999, Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal and Zeufack 2003) .
The details of the process that leads to rent sharing does not matter for our analysis. What matters is that …rm-speci…c worker productivity is partly re ‡ected in individual wages.
Using matched employer-employee data from Morocco, we examine the earnings education di¤erential in the manufacturing labor market. Morocco is a useful study case because it is fairly representative of other moderately open, middle income economy with manufacturing exports concentrated in labor intensive industries -i.e., textile, garment, and leather products.
Its proximity to Europe and trade agreement with the European Union also provides a useful comparison to Mexico, where the earnings skill gap has been shown to increase with trade openness to the US (e.g. Hanson and Harrison 1999 , Verhoogen 2007 , Kaplan and Verhoogen 2006 .
Using a Mincerian earnings regression, we …rst show a strong positive association between the export status of a …rm and the average wage it pays to its workers. Since Clerides et al. (1998) and, more recently, Fafchamps et al. (2007) have shown that Moroccan exporters are on average more productive than non-exporters, this is consistent with the idea that …rms share productivity rents with their workers. The exporter wage premium remains if we control for individual worker characteristics such as occupation within the …rm, gender, education, experience, length of tenure, and vocational training. But the estimated premium gets smaller or disappears, depending on functional form, once we control for …rm capital and labor (e.g. Oi and Idson 1999, Fafchamps and ).
Next we investigate whether there is a larger education wage premium in exporting …rms.
We estimate …rm …xed e¤ect regressions in which the export status of the …rm is interacted with worker education. We …nd no evidence that exporters pay a higher premium to educated workers.
Although exporting …rms employ slightly more educated people in middle management positions, they do not pay them more than other …rms. We do …nd that, controlling for education, exporters pay more to skilled production workers relative to unskilled ones, but the occupational de…nition of skill has little to do with education.
To check the robustness of our …ndings, we investigate several alternative speci…cations. First we examine whether …rms that start exporting or increase their export share increase wages as well. We …nd that they do not. Next we investigate whether workers who switch job enjoy a larger pay increase if they start working for an exporter. We …nd no such evidence.
These …ndings stand in contrast with much of the empirical literature. Focused on the Americas, the literature has tended to …nd a positive relationship between trade and the earnings skill di¤erential (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1997 , Hanson and Harrison 1999 , Verhoogen 2007 ).
This di¤erence with our …ndings may be due to the nature of Moroccan manufacturing exports, which remain concentrated in light industries such as textile and garments where wages are low compared to those paid in Morocco's main export markets. Sutton (2007) has hypothesized that the higher a country's labor cost is, the more it has to move up the quality ladder to remain internationally competitive. Better quality products in general require quality control procedures and a better technology, two features that probably call for better educated workers.
We investigate whether the data displays features that are consistent with these two ideas.
We …nd that technology and product quality are signi…cantly better in exporting …rms and industries, but the di¤erence is not large. We also check whether …rms that use a more modern technology and emphasize quality control also employ better educated workers. We …nd that they do. Exporters, in contrast, do not. We also …nd that …rms that emphasize quality and modern technology pay higher wages on average. They do not, however, pay a higher education premium.
Our favorite interpretation of the …ndings is that Sutton's conjecture applies reasonably well to Morocco: cheap and disciplined labor appears to be what brings exporters to the country, a …nding consistent with the work of on labor management.
Standard comparative advantage seems to account better for the Moroccan experience to date than trade models emphasizing human capital and technology transfer. While this provides some hope for countries with low levels of human capital wishing to initiate manufacturing exports, it may also explain why Moroccan manufacturing exports have not climbed the quality ladder and have failed to grow over time. Another possible interpretation is that rents shared with workers are shared equally, irrespective of the educational status of workers. This does not, however, explain why exporters do not employ better educated workers even though we …nd a strong association between technology, quality, and the average education level of the workforce.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline our estimation strategy. The data is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we examine the data for evidence of wage di¤erences between exporters and non-exporters. Technology and quality control are discussed in Section 5 while in Section 6 we interpret our results in the light of the existing literature and speculate as to why our approach yields results that seem at odds with those found using a di¤erent methodology.
Estimation strategy
The starting point of our analysis is a standard Mincerian earnings function of the form:
where w ijt denotes the earnings of worker i in …rm j at time t, H ijt denote a vector of human capital variables speci…c to worker i, Z jt is a vector of …rm characteristics (including industry dummies), D ijt is a vector of occupational dummies, and " ijt is a residual. The export status of the …rm is written as X jt . A positive coe¢ cient means that exporting …rms pay more to workers in general.
To test whether exporting …rms pay more to workers with more human capital, we add regressors of the form H ijt X jt :
If is signi…cantly larger than 0, this constitute evidence of a larger earnings skill gap within exporting …rms -a sign that human capital is more productive in exporting …rms. This is the approach applied to German data by Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) and Munch and Skaksen (2006) .
It is traditional to include occupation dummies in Mincerian wage regressions. The reason is that the wage workers receive is a¤ected by the tasks they undertake and their position in the …rm's hierarchy. To the extent that exporting …rms have a systematically di¤erent mix of occupations, omitting D ijt may result in omitted variable bias. The bias, however, may also go the other way. The occupational classi…cation of workers within the …rm is to some extent at the …rm's discretion. Exporting …rms may decide to reclassify educated workers in higher categories without changing their job description simply in order to pay them more. For this reason we estimate the model with and without occupation dummies.
Regression model (2.2) does not control for …rm-speci…c unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. Schank et al. 2007, Munch and Skaksen 2006) . Given that we have matched employer-employee data, we can control for this by adding a …rm-level …xed e¤ect u j to the model. The regression then takes the form:
Equation (2.3) does not permit the inclusion of time-invariant …rm-speci…c variables in the regression. In our data, the export status X jt of …rms hardly changes over time. Consequently, it is not possible to estimate precisely from (2.3). To obtain an estimate of , we follow Wooldridge (2002) , p.324, and regress …xed e¤ects on time-invariant …rm-characteristics. For this procedure to yield a consistent estimate of , X jt can be correlated with u j but must not be correlated with " ijt . We have no compelling reason to suspect that it is.
It is also possible that results are a¤ected by worker unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the regressors. This would arise, for instance, if more able workers are hired by exporting …rms. To control for this possibility, we use wage information which we have for two time periods
for each worker and we reestimate the model with worker …xed e¤ects:
It goes without saying that once we control for worker …xed e¤ects, time-invariant worker-speci…c regressors have to be dropped. This is true, for instance, of education and gender in H ijt . Since we do not have observations on the same workers working in di¤erent …rms over time, …rm-level …xed e¤ects u j drop out once we include worker …xed e¤ects. We use regression model (2.4) to examine whether better educated workers enjoy faster growing wages than uneducated ones, and whether the growth rate of wages vary between exporters and non-exporters.
Going from model (2.2) to models (2.3) and (2.4) enables us to control for a growing range of unobserved confounding factors. But it also puts increasing demands on the data, making identi…cation more di¢ cult. Put di¤erently, while the less restrictive model (2.2) may yield a false positive -i.e., a signi…cant coe¢ cient when the true e¤ect is zero, more restrictive models (2.3) and (2.4) may yield a false negative -i.e., a non-signi…cant coe¢ cient when the true e¤ect is not zero. What we hope for is that results are similar across models. A lengthy questionnaire was administered through face-to-face interviews with the …rm's manager, accountant, and head of human resources. The questionnaire gathered data about many aspects of the …rm's operation, including detailed information about exports and manpower over the two years preceding the survey. In addition to the …rm questionnaire, ten workers were individually interviewed in each …rm. These workers were selected at random by the enumerator assisted by the …rm's human resource manager. Enumerators were instructed to select at least one worker in each of the main occupational categories of the …rm. As a result upper management employees tend to be overrepresented (see Table 2 below). Although enumerators probably did not rely on formal random sampling, we have no reason to suspect any systematic sample selection bias. In particular, enumerators were not aware that the data would be used to examine the relationship between exports and wages.
The data
For each worker, information is available on a variety of worker characteristics as well as on current earnings, earnings one year prior to the survey, earnings at the time of hiring, and last earnings from the previous employer, if any. The matched employer-employee data have been used, together with similar data from other countries, to study the earnings education gap (Fafchamps, Soderbom and Benhassine 2006) and to investigate labor management and supervision issues .
The main characteristics of the surveyed …rms are summarized in The sample is more or less equally divided between exporters and non-exporters. Using the FACS data, Fafchamps et al. (2007) have shown that exporting manufacturers in Morocco are primarily young …rms geared towards export markets from their inception. Specialization in exports or domestic sales is indeed the norm: 47% of all …rms do not export any of their output while 34% export all their production. Only 17% of manufacturers serve both the domestic and export markets. 83% of all exports go to Europe, 46% to France alone; 6% of exports go to neighboring Maghreb countries, 5% to other destinations -primarily sub-Saharan Africa.
From Table 1 we see that exporters di¤er from non-exporters in a number of important respects. They tend to be larger, having on average twice as much equipment and more than three times as many workers. Juding by a simple t-test, these di¤erences are highly signi…cant.
Exporters employ slightly more casual workers, but the di¤erent is only borderline signi…cant.
The average education level of the workforce is basically identical across the two sets of …rms, which in itself already suggests that Moroccan exporters do not rely on a more educated workforce. Exporters do, however, employ signi…cantly more women who, on average, are paid less -see .
Moroccan exporters are concentrated in light industries -primarily garment, textile, and leather products. Of all 7 industrial sectors studied, the garment sector is the most oriented towards exports: on average, garment …rms export 80% of their output. Textile and leather manufacturers export, on average, 37-40% of their output. Food processors export a third.
The remaining three industries export less than 10% of their output on average. Given these di¤erences across industries, all regression analysis controls for industry dummies.
For each worker we have information on earnings at the time of the survey and one year prior to the survey. This results in observations on earnings for 7850 workers in two consecutive yearsapproximately 15,700 observations in total. 4 Given the way the sample of workers is constructed, workers in small …rms and in less common occupations are over-represented. To correct this bias, all regression results presented here are weighted by the size of the …rm's employment in each occupational category. This information is available from the …rm questionnaire. We also correct standard errors for clustering by …rm and strati…cation by occupation. 5
Descriptive statistics for the worker sample are presented in Table 2 , for the two years combined. To illustrate the importance of proper weighting, we report weighted and unweighted 4 This is slightly less than the theoretical maximum of 10 859 = 17180 because some of the interviewed workers have not been employed for a year or more. 5 Given the large number of individual e¤ects in some regressions, …xed e¤ects are not controlled for by introducing dummies in the survey regressions but by di¤erencing the data with respect to the weighted mean and applying the survey regression to the di¤erenced data. Experimentation shows that coe¢ cient estimates and standard errors are identical to those obtained by including individual dummies.
averages. Weighted monthly earnings are USD 293. The average age of workers is 33 years.
Education refers to completed years of schooling. Tenure is the number of years of employment with the current employer. Experience is the number of years elapsed since …nishing school, minus the time spent out of the labor force or in unemployment. Workers have on average 8 years of education and 7 years of tenure.
About a 51% of the weighted sample of workers are women, many of whom are illiterate.
Using regression analysis controlling for worker characteristics, have shown that in Moroccan manufacturing the wage received by women is on average 19% lower than that of men. Yet the share of women in labor force is higher in exporting industries. This is at prima facie inconsistent with the idea that exporting manufacturers rely on better skilled, highly paid workers.
The breakdown of the sample by occupational category shows that production workersskilled and unskilled -represent the bulk of manufacturing employment. We see that, because of strati…cation, management and administrative workers are overrepresented in the worker sample.
For this reason, throughout the analysis we weigh observations by occupational category within each …rm.
As emphasized in the modeling section, some variables of interest -such as education and gender -vary across workers but not over time. Others such as age, experience, and length of tenure vary by the same increment each year. Other variables in contrast vary over time but not across workers, such as the capital, employment, or the share of exports in the …rm's sales.
These variables also vary more across …rms than over time for a given …rm. These features must be kept in mind in the analysis.
Do exporters pay higher wages?
We begin by estimating model (2.1) controlling for sectoral …xed e¤ects. This is equivalent to comparing wages across workers and …rms in the same industry. We wish to investigate whether exporters pay higher wages. Given the existence of threshold e¤ects in exporting (Roberts and Tybout 1997) , the main variable of interest is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the …rm exports: we expect exporting …rms to di¤er from non-exporting …rms. We also include as additional regressor the proportion of exports in total sales to investigate whether wages vary systematically with export intensity. A large number of worker characteristics are included as control variables. Following current best practice, worker age, experience, and length of tenure enter the regression in quadratic form. A gender-education interaction term is included to capture the idea that returns to education di¤er by gender, a point emphasized by . The number of previous employers is included as additional regressor to control for job search e¤ects. We also include a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the worker reported his or her earnings net of taxes, 0 otherwise. Since earnings enter the regression in log form, the coe¢ cient of the dummy represents the average percentage gap between net and gross earnings.
A year dummy is included as well.
The results from this regression are shown in the …rst column of Table 3 . Reported coe¢ cients come from weighted regressions in which the weights are the number of workers in a given occupation present in the …rm in the relevant year. Weighting has a large e¤ect in estimated coe¢ cients. This is because unweighted earnings regressions fail to correct for the fact that most workers are employed by large …rms. Reported t-statistics are based on standard errors corrected for clustering at the …rm-occupation level. Correcting for clustering dramatically reduces t-values, indicating that earnings residuals are strongly correlated within …rms -a feature consistent with rent sharing.
Turning to the estimated coe¢ cients themselves, we …nd that exporting …rms pay more on average to otherwise observationally equivalent workers. Since exporting …rms are more productive than non-exporters (e.g. Fafchamps et al. 2007, Soderbom and Teal 2000) , this provides indirect evidence that exporting …rms share productivity rents with workers (see also Bigsten et al. (2003) ). The e¤ect nevertheless falls with the proportion of exports in total sales -albeit it remains positive.
Other estimated coe¢ cients are by and large in line with the literature, suggesting that our data are not remarkable. Worker characteristics have the expected sign, and many are signi…cant. Education, for instance, is highly signi…cant. Results indicate decreasing returns to experience and non-linear age e¤ects. Wages are also found to increase signi…cantly with the number of previous employers, suggesting that workers who switch employer raise their wage over time. This is probably because of selection e¤ects. All these results are in line with much of the available evidence. The education and gender wage gaps in these data are examined in detail by , so we need not discuss them further here.
A spurious correlation between exports and wages may arise because, as we have seen in Table 1 , exporters tend to be larger …rms and, as been documented in the literature, larger …rms pay more on average. To examine this possibility, in the second column we add regressors for …rm size by including the logarithms of …rm capital and total employment as additional regressors. As in most of the literature (Wagner 2007) , we …nd that …rms with more capital pay higher wages on average. The coe¢ cient of the export dummy remains signi…cant once we control for …rm size but the export share variable is no longer signi…cant.
Following Tsou, Liu and Huang (2006) and Munch and Skaksen (2006) , we also reestimate column 2 with the share of exports and its square -but without the export dummy. Results are summarized at the bottom of Table 3 where we report two F -statistics. The …rst one tests whether earnings are higher among …rms that export 50%; the second one tests whether earnings are higher in …rms that export all their output. The choice of a 50% share is driven by the fact that the quadratic relationship between exports and earnings peaks at around 50% of exports.
Test results show that the relationship is only signi…cantly positive for …rms that export half of their output, not for those that export all. Taken together, these results con…rm that there is a weak albeit non-linear empirical association between earnings and export share in our data.
A closer look at the data reveals that small …rms tend to fully specialized in either exports or domestic sales. Only large …rms sell to both markets. It therefore not surprising that the export share variable is negatively signi…cant in column since it (inversely) proxies for …rm size among exporting …rms.
Next we test whether earnings vary when …rms change their exports. 6 To do this, we reestimate model (2.1) controlling for …rm-level …xed e¤ects. 7 In this case, identi…cation of the export coe¢ cient is achieved from …rms that changed their exports between the two consecutive years for which we have individual worker earnings. Some 60 …rms changed their export share in our data, representing 7% of the sample. 8 This may be too small to …nd a signi…cant e¤ect, especially if the change in export structure takes time to a¤ect earnings.
Results are reported in the third column of Table 3 . Coe¢ cients of worker speci…c regressors are similar to those reported in columns 2 and 3, except that standard errors are somewhat larger. But the coe¢ cients of the export variables are not signi…cant. As shown at the bottom on column 3, the same …nding obtains if we include a quadratic term in export share: both F -statistics are non-signi…cant. Such …nding is not unusual: other authors have found that switching in or out of exporting does not have an immediate wage e¤ect. Bernard and Jensen (1997) even …nd a negative relationship between the two. Taken together, our results suggest that the positive association between earnings and export arises largely from di¤erences across …rms. 9 The last column of Table 3 reports results from a worker …xed e¤ect regression. This regression compares identical workers between the two consecutive years for which we have earnings data. Its purpose is to test whether individual workers get paid more when their employer begins exporting or exports more. Most worker characteristics drop out of the regression as they either do not change over time or are collinear with the year dummy. From the coe¢ cient of the year dummy we see that nominal wages increased on average by 8.1% between the two survey years.
The capital and manpower variables are positive and signi…cant, suggesting that …rms that grow raise wages to already employed workers -and vice versa. The coe¢ cient of the export share variable is again not signi…cant while that of the export dummy is signi…cant but negative. This latter result is based on a very small number of …rms that switched exporter status between the two years, and thus should be taken with caution.
We repeat the above analysis separately for each of the six industrial sectors in our sample. If human capital is essential for exports, the education wage gap should be higher in industries that export more. We …nd the opposite. In the three leading export industries (garments, textile, and leather), the education wage premium ranges from 1.2% per year of schooling (leather) 9 To investigate this issue further, we regress log earnings on worker characteristics and time-speci…c …rm-level …xed e¤ects uit (i.e., 859 2 …xed e¤ects). These …xed e¤ects measure the …rm-speci…c wage premium in year t, correcting for workers' observable characteristics. We then recover the b uit's and regress them on sector …xed e¤ects, export share, capital, and labor. The logic of this procedure was touched upon in Section 2 and is discussed in detail in Wooldridge (2002) , p.324. Results, not presented here to save space, show that exporting …rms have, on average, a higher …rm-speci…c wage premium. But the export variable is no longer signi…cant once we control for labor and capital. This is true whether we include a quadratic export share term or not. to 2.2% (textile) and 3.9% (garment). 10 In contrast, the education wage premium is 5.2% in food processing, 5.4% in electrical machinery, 5% in chemicals, and 3.6% in rubber and plastics.
Leading export industries thus tend to have a lower education wage premium. In no case is the coe¢ cient of exports signi…cant in the …rm …xed-e¤ect regression. We also reestimate all the regressions separately for men and women. The results are similar to those reported in Table 3 , albeit generally less signi…cant given the smaller sample size.
Is there an education premium among exporters?
Taken together, results so far suggest that there is a positive relationship between wage earnings and exporting status. But this relationship disappears once we control for the fact that exporting …rms are, on average, larger. As we explained in Section 2, these results may nevertheless be misleading because the estimated export coe¢ cient fails to account for di¤erences in the education level of workers. Our hypothesis is that the return to human capital is higher among exporters, and hence that exporters pay educated workers more. To test this conjecture, we proceed as outlined in equation (2.2) and reestimate the last three regressions presented in Table 3 with cross terms between years of schooling and the export dummy. Because exporters employ many women, we also include an interaction term between gender and exports.
Results are shown in Table 4 . Contrary to expectations, we …nd in column 1 that the interaction term is not signi…cant, which indicates that the education wage premium does not depend on whether the …rm exports or not. The schooling-export interaction remains non signi…cant when we control for …rm …xed e¤ects (column 2) or worker …xed e¤ects (column 3). If we replace the export dummy by the export share in the interaction term, the coe¢ cient becomes negative and signi…cant (in columns 1 and 2), which also rejects the idea that exporters pay educated workers more. Broadly similar conclusions obtain if we replace the export dummy with the square of the export share -and its interaction with education and gender (see bottom of the Table) . We also …nd that the wage premium for women is smaller among exporters. As we have pointed out in Table 1 , exporters employ a larger proportion of women than non-exporters.
Many of these women are illiterate.
We repeat the same analysis by industry. Again we …nd no consistent pattern. In the industry …xed-e¤ect regressions, the schooling-export interaction term is signi…cantly negative in food processing and garment manufacturing, signi…cantly positive in textile and electrical machinery, and non-signi…cant in the other two. When we control for …rm or worker …xed-e¤ects, several of these results are reversed, making sectoral regressions results largely inconclusive.
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 do not control for the occupation status of the worker within the …rm. Conceivably, this may lead to a bias if exporters have a di¤erent hierarchical structure and hence a di¤erent mix of occupations than non-exporters. This may even explain our lack of evidence of higher returns to human capital among exporters if exporters employ more low education workers in better paid middle management jobs.
To investigate this possibility, we begin by regressing the share of a …rm's workforce in each occupational status on an export dummy, the log of capital, the log of employment, and industry dummies. Results con…rm that exporters have more middle management than non-exporters.
To test whether di¤erences in workforce composition can account for our results so far, we reestimate the models presented in Table 4 with occupational dummies. Controlling for the occupational status of the worker does not change earlier …ndings. Results are not shown here to save space.
Comparing the wage that workers receive from their current employer to the wage paid by their previous employer also provides a way of testing the relationship between exporting and wages. If workers receive more when their new employer is an exporter, especially if they are well educated, this would suggest that identical workers are paid more by exporters compared to non-exporters. We do not have panel data following workers across …rms and thus do not know the exporter status of the previous employer. But we know the last wage paid by the previous employer, if any, and the …rst wage paid by the current employer. This information alone enables us to identify an exporter wage e¤ect as long as the export status of the employer is not perfectly correlated across employers of the same worker -something we unfortunately cannot test.
We proceed as follows. We estimate three worker …xed e¤ect regressions comparing the earnings of individual workers between the current employer and the previous one. The dependent variable is di¤erence between the (log of the) last wage paid by the previous employer and the (log of the) wage paid to the worker when he or she began working for the current employer.
In the …rst regression we only include a new job dummy and interaction terms between this dummy and education. The coe¢ cient of the new job dummy yields the percentage increase in earnings resulting from the change of employer. The interaction terms measure whether this percentage increase is larger for educated and trained workers, respectively. Regression results are presented in the …rst column of Table 6 . We see that workers who shift employer enjoy on average an 11.1% wage increase. The education interaction term is positive but not signi…cant.
We then test whether the rise in earnings between jobs is higher when the current employer is an exporter. To this e¤ect we introduce an interaction term between the new job dummy and the export share. The results, presented in the second column of Table 5, indicate that, if anything, workers receive a smaller wage increase when they begin working for an exporter.
The e¤ect, however, is not signi…cant.
We also investigate whether the wage change is higher for educated workers working in ex-porting …rms, as would be expected if human capital has a higher productivity among exporters.
To this e¤ect, we interact the exporter status variable with education and the new job dummy.
Results, shown in the third column of Table 6 , are not signi…cant: being educated does not lead to a higher wage increase when starting to work for an exporter.
It is conceivable that human capital is only useful in certain tasks, such as worker supervision. In that case, it is possible that educated workers gain by switching jobs only in certain occupations. To test this, we estimate the model reported in Table 5 for each occupation separately. Results, not shown here, show that the new job dummy is strongly signi…cant for all workers except top and middle managers. We obtain a signi…cantly negative export-new job interaction coe¢ cient for middle management and skilled workers; the e¤ect is not signi…cant for other occupations. We also …nd a positive and signi…cant education-export-new job coe¢ -cient for middle management; in other occupations, the coe¢ cient is not signi…cant. Because the export-new job dummy is negative, however, this only means that the smaller wage gain for middle managers resulting from joining an exporting …rm is attenuated for those with higher education.
Finally, we hypothesize that the lack of earnings education di¤erential between exporters and non-exporters may be because of job reclassi…cation, i.e., because exporters promote workers more readily. We investigate whether this is the case but …nd no signi…cant evidence that exporters and non-exporters di¤er in their propensity to promote workers across occupations.
Quality and technology
We have found no evidence that exporters pay a higher premium to educated workers. The question is why. Could it be that our testing strategy is ‡awed? We would like to know whether we found no evidence of a higher education premium in exporting …rms because returns to human capital are not higher in exporting …rms, or because workers do not share these returns.
To this we now turn.
There are several reasons why we expect returns to human capital to be higher in exporting …rms. One is technology: exporters get to know about other methods of production through their foreign contacts; to integrate these new methods of production into their own …rm, they need better trained workers and managers. Since exporters are on average more productive than non-exporters (Fafchamps et al. 2007 ), they are also in a better position to use retained earnings to invest in better technology (e.g. Yeaple 2005 , Bustos 2005 ).
Another channel is product quality: to be successful, exporters must compete not only on price but also on quality (Sutton 2007) . This is especially true if they export to developed countries where consumers are more demanding (Tro…menko 2007) . Raising quality requires a stricter organization of the production process, involving quality control procedures, closer supervision of workers, and better tracking of products through the chain. This typically calls for more educated workers (better able to follow rigid procedures and written instructions) -and managers (better able to supervise the production process). In practice, technology and quality control often are intertwined since a better, more up-to-date technology is typically required to achieve high quality standards. But they need not -think of hand-made crafts and other 'boutique'consumer products.
The FACS dataset contains information on technology and quality control. This information is summarized in Table 6 and broken down by exporter status. The …rst variable is the average age of the machinery used in the …rm. 11 The second is an index of technological sophistication that takes value 2 if the …rm uses machines that are controlled electronically (e.g., by computer), value 1 if the …rm uses automated machinery that is not electronically controlled, and 0 otherwise. We see that, for both variables, exporters on average have a more up-to-date technology.
The di¤erence is not large, however, and the average technology level is rather low.
The next reported variable takes value 1 if the …rm aims its products primarily at the low end of the market, 3 if it targets the high-end of the market, and 2 otherwise. We also have information about quality control, i.e.: whether the …rm has an ISO certi…cation; whether it provides warranty on its products; and whether it has a customer services department (service apres-vente). Combining these, we construct an index of quality control that is the sum of the three. We see in Table 6 that exporters are more likely to aim for the top-end of the market and to undertake some form quality control. The di¤erence is signi…cant but not large. Table 6 shows a signi…cant although weak association between technology, quality control, and exports. This may simply be due to …rm size: exporters tend to be larger. To investigate this possibility, we regress each of the four variables shown in Table 6 on the export dummy, the logs of capital and manpower, and sectoral …xed e¤ects. Results shown that, even after controlling for size and industry, exporting remains signi…cantly associated with a lower age of machinery and a higher propensity to aim for the top-end of the market.
We can now ask whether there is any evidence that returns to human capital are higher in …rms that use more modern technology or put more emphasis on quality. Our idea is simple: if educated workers are more productive in these …rms, the …rms should either hire more of them or pay them more (or both) -depending on the conditions prevailing on the labor market. Table 7 investigates the …rst possibility. The dependent variable is the average education level of the …rm's workforce, as reported by each …rm. The information is available by occupational category. This enables us to investigate whether the importance of human capital varies by occupation. We also control for export dummy, …rm size, and industry. We expect the education level of production workers to be particularly critical for technology: automated machines, especially those controlled electronically, are probably best operated by literate workers. In contrast, we expect the education level of managers to be particularly critical for setting up rigorous quality control.
Results con…rm that better quality and technology are associated with a better educated workforce: three of the four variables are signi…cant with respect to the total workforce of the …rm (column 1). Although not signi…cant in column 1, the quality control index is signi…cant in the management regressions. Technology is associated with better educated production workers while quality control is associated with better educated managers. In contrast, the export dummy is never signi…cant.
This shows that …rms with better technology and quality control hire more educated workers.
This con…rms that the assumed link between quality and human capital is present in our data.
We now investigate whether this is also re ‡ected in higher wages. To this e¤ect, we reestimate the …rst regression of Table 4 with technology and quality regressors. Interaction terms between them and schooling are introduced sequentially. 12 Other regressors are as in Table 4 (column 1). Industry dummies as well as …rm and worker characteristics are included in the estimation but not shown. Firm …xed e¤ects are not included since quality and technology variables are time-invariant in our data.
Results are presented in Table 8 . We …nd that three of the four technology and quality variables are systematically associated with higher wages. The only exception is, as in Table 7 , the quality control index, which is not signi…cant in any of the regressions. Interaction terms with schooling have the expected sign, except for the age of machinery which has the wrong sign. As in Table 4 , the interaction term between schooling and the export dummy is never signi…cant.
Taken together, the evidence presented here suggests that returns to human capital are higher in …rms using a more up-to-date technology and aiming at the top-end of the market. This is most visible in the education regressions presented in Table 7 . Although better technology and quality are associated with higher wages in general, we do not …nd strong evidence of an excess education premium. This may be because rents are shared among all the workers of a …rm, irrespective of their education level.
Discussion
These results presented in this paper contribute to the existing literature in several ways. Many authors have found a positive relationship between the earnings skill di¤erential and trade liberalization (e.g. Atanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004 , Epifani and Gancia 2004 , Denny et al. 2002 , Bernard and Jensen 1997 , Robbins and Gindling 1999 , Gindling and Robbins 2001 , Hanson and Harrison 1999 , Verhoogen 2007 , Kaplan and Verhoogen 2006 . There are some exceptions, however. Gonzaga, Filho and Terra (2006) , for instance, …nd that, in Brazil, the earnings skill gap fell with trade liberalization. Pavcnik, Blom, Schady and Schady (2004) also …nd no relationship between the skill premium and the level of trade openness in Brazil. Soderbom and Teal (2000) come to a similar conclusion in their study of manufacturing export patterns in sub-Saharan Africa. Robbins, cited in Hanson and Harrison (1999) , reportedly …nds that the relative wages of skilled workers rose following trade liberalization in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the Philippines, but was stable or fell in Argentina and Malaysia.
Most of these …ndings are obtained by examining how the earnings skill di¤erential evolves over time during episodes of trade liberalization. Tari¤ reduction is seen as a 'quasi-natural experiment'. Identi…cation is achieved through a before-after comparison that implicitly assumes that the technological and institutional factors driving earnings di¤erentials change less rapidly over time than trade openness. This approach is appealing because it takes care of general equilibrium e¤ects. But it is susceptible to omitted variable bias since the researcher does not observe what would happen in the absence of trade liberalization.
We followed Bernard and Jensen (1997) and focused instead on di¤erences across …rms around a given point in time. Identi…cation is predicated on the assumption that, if the productivity of individual workers is at least partly re ‡ected in their wages and if skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers in exporting …rms, then we should observe a di¤erent earnings gap for educated workers among exporting and non-exporting …rms.
With some exceptions (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1997 , Kaplan and Verhoogen 2006 , Schank et al. 2007 , Munch and Skaksen 2006 , research on this issue has focused on data aggregated at the sectoral level, perhaps because of the dearth of matched employer-employee data in developing countries. The works of Kaplan and Verhoogen (2006) and Schank et al. (2007) are exceptions but, for con…dentiality reasons, Kaplan and Verhoogen (2006) only have limited …rm-level data. We rely here on matched employer-employee data using a dataset that we collected and that contains detailed information about both …rms and workers. We reach conclusions that are di¤erent from those obtained by most of the existing literature.
This raises the question of why the two approaches yield di¤erent results. One possible explanation is that returns to human capital vary across industries and thus across countries, depending on what they export. In the traditional trade literature, the emphasis was put not on human capital but on cheap labor as a driving force behind export success (e.g. Baldwin 1992 , Feenstra 2004 ). This view …nds some support in our data: much of the export wage premium can be attributed to a …rm size e¤ect, and exporting …rms in Morocco rely heavily on female workers who are paid less than men and who have very low levels of education.
It is possible that exporting industries in Morocco di¤er from those of countries such as
Mexico where the earnings skill gap is positive. Verhoogen (2007) , for instance, describes in great detail the e¤ect of trade liberalization on Mexican car manufacturing. Morocco does not export cars, however -only labor intensive garment, textile, and leather products, and it does so using a largely illiterate female workforce. This may explain why human capital does not play as important a role in Morocco compared to Mexico.
This interpretation is consistent with the idea that countries'comparative advantage di¤er depending on their level of human capital: countries with a comparative advantage in human capital are expected to export products that require human capital, such as high-quality products (Sutton 2007) . Countries with little human capital are expected to export labor-intensive products instead. This …ts our …ndings, except that the evidence presented here adds an important caveat. While a labor-abundant country may export low quality products in the aggregate, within a given industry exports to developed countries must meet minimum quality standards to be acceptable to demanding consumers and delivery chains (Tro…menko 2007) . Although Morocco exports labor-intensive products that may be of lower quality than what is produced in destination countries, these exports tend to be, on average, of higher quality than what is sold on the domestic Moroccan market.
Another possible explanation for the di¤erence between our results and results obtained by examining trade liberalization episodes is suggested by the work of Bernard and Jensen on US exporters. Comparing the wages paid by US exporters and non-exporters, Bernard and Jensen (1995) …nd that exporters pay 8% more to production workers and 7.3% more to nonproduction workers (who, on average, are more skilled). This means that the skilled to unskilled wage gap is slightly smaller among US exporters, a result similar to ours. Yet, applying a time series approach to the same US exporters, Bernard and Jensen (1997) …nd an increase in US manufacturing exports in the 1980's associated with an increase in the wage gap between highand low-skilled workers. The authors note that much of the increased wage gap is driven by increases in employment at exporting plants.
The apparent contradiction between the two results can be explained by compositional effects: a rise in exports may increase (decrease) the proportion of skilled (unskilled) workers in exporting …rms that pay more to all workers. 13 It follows that, even if the skilled-unskilled wage gap is the same for exporters and non-exporters, it is possible to observe a rise in the average earnings skill di¤erential -as in Mexico -or a fall -as in Brazil -depending on the relative shares of skilled workers in the workforce of exporters and non-exporters, respectively. This interpretation is consistent with what Gonzaga et al. (2006) report regarding the relative skill intensity of export and non-export industries. In Morocco we similarly …nd that exporters are on average no more likely to employ educated workers than non-exporters.
Conclusion
We have sought to test whether returns to human capital are higher in exporting …rms. To this e¤ect, we have tested whether manufacturing exporters pay educated workers more. Using a panel of matched employer-employee data from Morocco, we have found no evidence that educated workers receive a higher education premium relative to uneducated workers when 1 3 To see why, imagine a simple situation in which manufacturing is small so that general equilibrium e¤ects on wages can be ignored. Let d > 1 be the within-…rm earnings skill di¤erential, meaning that if an uneducated workers earns w in …rm i, an educated worker in the same …rm earns on average wd. Assume that d is constant across …rms and let x > 1 be the wage premium paid by exporters to all their workers, skilled and unskilled. Further let < 0:5 be the proportion of workers employed by exporters. Finally, let 0 < Sx < 1 and 0 < Sn < 1 be the share of skilled workers in the workforce of exporters and non-exporters, respectively. The average earnings skill di¤erential D in the economy is:
where S Sn(1 ) + Sx . It can be shown that, for most values of < 0:5, the average earnings skill di¤erential D increases with employment in the export industry whenever Sx > Sn. This is because, when Sx > (<)Sn, a rise in exports increases (decreases) the proportion of skilled (unskilled) workers working in exporting …rms that pay more to all workers. working for exporters. We also found that, although exporters pay more on average, much of the di¤erence can be explained by the fact that they have a larger workforce and more capital.
These …ndings di¤er from the literature which has often found a positive relationship between trade liberalization and the skill earnings gap.
The question is how to reconcile these contrasted …ndings. One possibility, discussed above, is that the relationship between trade liberalization and skill earnings di¤erential is driven by composition e¤ects: exporters pay more on average to all workers and trade liberalization raises employment in exporting …rms. Another possibility is that rent sharing operates at the level of the …rm, not of the individual worker: …rms that redistribute average productivity rents to their workforce may do so across the board, without di¤erentiating between high and low productivity workers. This would break the link between earnings and the …rm-speci…c productivity of individual workers. This could explain the absence of relationship between exports, human capital, and earnings. This leaves us with two sharply contrasted views of export success, the …rst emphasizing the role of human capital and the second the role of cheap labor. To a country trying to break into export markets, which of these two views is correct has profound implications for policy regarding education, vocational training, wage control, and labor regulation. These two views need not be incompatible, however. The work presented here suggests that returns to human capital are not particularly high in labor intensive export industries such as the ones found in Morocco. Instead we …nd circumstantial evidence that export success is linked to an abundant supply of cheap uneducated female labor.
The low level of human capital present in Moroccan …rms may nevertheless explain why manufacturing exports from that country have remained focused on a few labor intensive industries -and why they have failed to grow over time. Human capital may not be necessary to begin exporting manufactures, but it may be essential to climb the quality ladder and remain competitive when the cheap labor advantage starts to erode. Number of observations (**) 859 (*) sum of following: (1) ISO certification; (2) customer warranty; (3) client services (**) with some small variation across variables because of missing values (***) p-value from a test of equality (t-test for age of machinery, Pearson Chi-square for the other three 414 Estimated using weighted OLS with robust SE corrected for stratification and clustering at the firm-occupation level. The corresponding t-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients. Significance level: 1% ***; 5% **; 10% *
